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ABSTRACT
We develop a mathematical analysis model to calculate the probability of intercept
(POI) for the ground-based communication intercept (COM INT) system. The POI is a
measure of the elfectivcness of the intercept system. We define the POI as the product
of the probability of detection and the probability of coincidence.
The probability of detection is a measure of the receiver's capability to detect a sig-
nal in the presence of noise. The probability of coincidence is the probability that an
intercept system is available, actively listening in the proper frequency band, in the right
direction and at the same time that the signal is received.
We investigate the behavior of the POI with respect to the observation tinie, the
separation distance, antenna elevations, the frequency of the signal, and the receiver
bandwidths. We observe that the coincidence characteristic between the receiver scan-
ning parameters and the signal parameters is the key factor to determine the time to
obtain a given POI. This model can be used to find the optimal parameter combination
to maximize the POI in a given scenario. We expand this model to a multiple system.
This analysis is conducted on a personal computer to provide the portability. The
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I. INTRODUCTION
In modern warfare, Electronic Warfare (EW) plays an important role in overall
military strategy which concentrates on the neutralization of the enemy's command,
control and communications, also called O, while maintaining the capability of operat-
ing friendly O systems. EW, as defined in a dictionary of military terms generated by
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, is "a militar>' action involving the use of electromagnetic
energy to determine, exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of electromagnetic spectrum
and action which retains friendly use of electromagnetic spectrum."! Ref 1]
EW is organized into three major categories - electronic warfare support measures
(ESM), electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures
(ECCM). Among these three areas, ESM provides a source of information recjuired to
conduct the other areas. By defmition, ESM is the division of EW involving actions
taken to search for, intercept, locate, and immediately identify sources of
electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition and the tactical
employment offerees. [Ref 2] The key functions of ES.M are intercepting, identifying,
analyzing, and locating sources of hostile radiation. ESM performs the following
tasks:! Ref 3]
• search in time, space and frequency to detect signal activity
• determine signal classification and extract signal intelligence
• determine emitter locations
• decide which actions should be taken (for example, cease minitoring, continue to
monitor, apply ECM, and so on).
In other words, ES.M is designed to answer several questions related to enemy systems
as follows:
• what is it ?
• where is it ?
• what is it doing ?
• what is it going to do ?
• what should be done about it ?
The command and control of forces requires the use of communications. Tiie
communication signals may also be intercepted and analyzed to determine the identity.
disposition and intentions of forces. This type of activity is called signal intelligence
(SIGINT) which is performed for intelligence gathering. SIGINT is defined as the
product resulting from the collection, evaluation analysis, integration, and interpretation
of information derived from intercepted electromagnetic emissions. I he subdivisions of
SIGINT are electronic intelligence (ELINT), communication intelligence (COM INT)
and radiation intelligence (RINT). (Ref 2] ELINT is the intelligence information that
is the product of collection and processing, for subsequent intelligence purposes, of po-
tentially hostile, non-communications electromagnetic radiations which emanate from
other than nuclear detonations and radioactive sources. COM INT is the intelligence
derived from potentially hostile communications by other than the intended recipients.
A third division of SIGINT called RINT is the intelligence derived from potentially
hostile communications and weapons system by virtue of their unintended spurious
emissions, even when in a non-transmitting mode of operation. In military field manu-
als, foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT) is taken into consideration
instead of RINT. FISINT is the the technical information derived from intercept of
electromagnetic emissions, such as telemetry, associated with the testing and operational
deployment of foreign aerospace surface and subsurface instrumentation.[Rcf 4]
As a subdivision of SIGINT, COMINT is a strategically oriented activity while ra-
dar ESM has a more tactical orientation. COMINT generally focus on producing in-
telligence data which is not as time critical as radar ESM data. However, there is some
overlap between COMINT and the radar ESM in practice. The diflerence between the
radar ESM and COMINT can be explained as follows.
For the radar ESM
• Transmitter and receiver usually collocated
• 1 wo-way range for transmission
• No encryption for message security
• Easier to spoof
For COMINT
• Transmitter and receiver at different locations
• One way range for transmission
• Encryption for message security
• Diflicult to Croat false nicssacc
An intercept system, in conducting the COMINT operations, usually consists of an
antenna, a receiver, a signal display( spectrum analyzer) and an operator. If a signal of
interest is transmitted and subsequently acquired by an intercept system, then \vc con-
sider that the signal has been intercepted. In general, no one has prior knowledge that
the signal will be transmitted at a given time, or even the frequency or geometric location
of the emitter. Thus, it is generally necessary to conduct a temporal, spectral and spatial
search in order to intercept the signal. The environment from whicli the signal of inter-
est must be extracted normally contains many signals which are of no interest at all.
The various signals appear and disappear, creating a dynamic environment which must
be continually examined if the signals of interest are to be intercepted.
In signal intercept systems, the ability of the system to perform its function is di-
rectly related to the probability that the signals of interest will be received, detected and
identified. This is referred to as the Probability of Intercept (POI). In an ideal system,
POI should be unity. The POI concept can be applied to the communication environ-
ment to analyze the performance of communications intercept sytems. The POI can be
written as a function of an observation timc(/), a distance between the emitter and the
intercept station(rt'), a frequency of the signal (/) and the various interceptor parameters.
Some of the parameters are not controllable by the intercept station. These parameters
must be specified in a given scenario. The other parameters can be selected to maximize
the POI in the COMINT operation. Not many references are available in the POI ap-
plications to the COMINT operation while many are available in the radar USM system.
The objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of the intercept system parame-
ters to the POI in the COMINT operation. However, because of the complexities of the
signal environment and the COMINT receiver, we have to simplify the scenario in order
to analyze the POI mathematically in the COMINT operation. The scenario considered
in this thesis is that a ground mobile intercept station (GMIS) is deployed in a forward
area to intercept the short range tactical communication of the hostile emitter. The ac-
curacy of this analysis is limited by the degree of simplification of the scenario.
In Chapter Two, we specify the COMINT scenario and review some factors aflect-
ing the POI. In Chapter 1 hrce, we define the problem to be analyzed and present the
fundamental theory for deriving the POI, the probability of detection (which is a func-
tion of signal-to-noise ratio), and the probability of coincidence for temporal, spectral
and spatial coincidence factors (which can be described as window functions). Further-
more, we discuss the POI for multiple systems In Chapter four, we explain the method
of analysis and analyze the relationship between the POI and the various parameters.
using the results obtained by MATHCAD, a computer software package for solving
mathematical equations. In Chapter Five ue conclude the discussion and make rec-
ommendations for further investieation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. COMMUNICATION INTERCEPT SCENARIO
Militar\' radio communication equipment generally operates in the high frequency
(HF), very high frequency (VHF) and ultra-high frequency (UIIF) portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum. The operation frequencies are 2 to 30 MIIz for HF, 30 to
88 MHz and 116 to 150 MHz for VHF and 225 to 400 MHz for UHF. The VHF/UHF
bands are used for line-of-sight (LOS) communication while the HF band is used for
both longer range over-the-horizon (OTH) transmissions using sky waves and shorter
range communication using ground waves.[Ref 2] Appendix A shows some of the pa-
rameter characteristics of the potential enemy emitters.
1 he volume of communication signals can be very large with 9000 channels poten-
tially available at WF, 3680 at VHF, and 7000 at UHF.(Ref 2 ] In addition, a large
volume of military communication is transmitted by telephonic and telegraphic means
over either wire or radio relay links. COM INT generally does not focus at these latter
types of communications systems, since the wire communications require too much ef-
fort to make intercept possible.
The function of COMINT receivers which operate against cominunications systems
closely parallels the use of FLINT receivers against non-communication emitters.
COMINT is used to build up a library of the characteristics of enemy communication
emitters. 1 his database is then used in battlefield situations along with communication
ESM receivers.
There are four primary functions performed by communication ESM systems, which
are; identification of the operating frequency of active emitters, measurement of tiicir
bearing or location, analysis of traffic to assess its threat significance and maintenance
and updating of the current database. The first two functions are performed by the
spectrum analysis and the Direction Finding (DF) equipment. DF is a key element in
sorting and locating communication signals due to the dense communication signal
cnviroimicnt.
A large number of both AM and FM communication signals transmitted by low-
power mobile and high-power fixed stations, at various locations, causes the dynamic
range required at a typical intercept site to equal 80 dB. [Ref 2J The exceptionally long
propagation paths possible at HF generally cause a large percentage of channel
occupancy in this band. In LOS YUr/LUr communication systems, with typically 25
KHz ciiaimels, the occupancy is expected to be somewhat less than that in the HF band.
These high occupancies, and the wide dynamic range, require the use of a high sensitivity
receiver with typically 100 dB suppression of signals in adjacent channels.
Communication ESM receivers must be sensitive, accurate, invulnerable to large
out-of-channel interfering signals and remotely controlled. The frequency coverage ex-
tends from 2 to 500 MHz, where the lower band (HF) consists of both long-range sky
wave and short-range ground wave transmissions, and the upper band (VIIF/UFIF) is
used for short-range vehicle and man-pack communications.
Intercept receivers which look for short-range emitters must be stationed in forward
areas, and therefore must be mobile and rugged. The requirements for communication
signal interception are summarized in Table l.[Ref 5]
Table 1. REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMUNICATIONS INTERCEPTION
Frequency Range (MHz) 2 - 500
Receiver Accuracy (llz) 100
Signal Type 1 ms duration to modulated CW
Sensitivity (dBm) better than -105
Resolution (KHz) (HF) 1 (VHF,'LHF)5 -25
Instantaneous Dynamic Range (dB) greater than 80
Amplitude y\ccuracy (dB) 1
Bearing Accuracy (degrees) 1
Signal Density 10' - 10^ emitters
Intercept Probability (percent) 100
The communication ESM receivers typically feed into a command center where the
various interceptions are analyzed and decisions are made to employ countermeasure
techniques against high priority communication links.
B. SOME FACTORS AFFECTING INTERCEPT PROBABILITY
I. Space Attenuation Factor - Received Signal Pouer
'I he primary methods of communications by the various elements in infantry
or mechanized divisions arc typically IVeciuency modulated (FM) radios and amplitude
modulated (AM) radios. FM utilizes voice transmission lor short distance LOS
communications and AM uses digital format type transmission for long distance
communications.
General tactical AM,'I-"iM radios operate in the frequency range of 2 to 500 MHz
with typical output power of from 1 watt (in portable manpacked radios) to 30 watts
or more for the vehicular mounted radios. A detailed description of the einitters of in-
terest is given in Appendix A.
The interception may occur if the sensitivity of the receiver is appropriate to the
transmitter output power. In case of propagation above 30 MIIz, free space propa-
gation is assumed if a LOS path exists. In this case, the power relationship between the
transmitted and the received can be expressed as follows.[Ref 6: P.I 124]
where
S, = Available signal power at the receiver input in milliwatts
P, = Power radiated from the transmitting antenna in milliwatts
G, = Power gain due to directivity of the transmitter antenna
G, = Power gain due to directivity of the receiver antenna
g = Multipath factor
L^ = Propagation (or Path) loss
Available signal power at the receiver input in decibels is:
SiidDm) = l\[dBm) + G^{dD) + G,{dB) + 10 log ^ - Lp{dB)
where
S,{dDni) = Available signal power at the receiver input in decibels below one milliwatt
P,{dBin) = Power radiated from transmitted antenna in decibels below one milliwatt
G,{dB) = Power gain due to directivity of the transmitter antenna in decibels
GXdB) = Power gain due to directivity of the receiver antenna in decibels
L^{dB) = Propagation loss in decibels
The effective transmitted power, P,G„ is in the range of 0.5 to 50 watts for the
scenario under consideration. A minimum of four essential parameters niust be supplied
in order to calculate the propagation loss. These are the carrier frequency (/) in
megahertz, the path distance (d) in kilometers and the transmitting and receiving an-
tenna height above ground {h, and h,) in meters. Other path parameters used in tiie
computations such as horizon distances and elevation angles, may be derived from these
values and available terrain information.
The free-space basic transmission loss is
Lpf^{dB) = 32.45 -I- 20 \ogJ{MHz) + 20 log d{km)
where
Lpf,{dB) = Free space path loss in decibels
/[MHz) = Center frequency of the signal in megahertz
d{km) = Distance between emtter and intercept system in kilometers
For LOS calculations for radio signals, this equation provides a good approxi-
mation as long as the assumption of homogeneous atmosphere is made and first Fresnel
zone clearance is achieved. Ihe description of full and incomplete first Fresnel zone
clearance is shown in Fig.l. The method of calculation of first Fresnel zone clearance
is well expressed by Jordan (Ref 7: p.33-17].
Since most FM tactical radios are normally stationed close to the ground, or
grazing LOS as depicted in Fig. 1(b), first Fresnel zone clearance is assumed to be in-
complete for most transmissions and an additional six decibel loss is assumed, as shown
in Fig. 2.
Ihe additional attenuation factor should be computed using methods based on
different propagation mechanisms. Well within radio LOS, the formulas of two-ray op-
tics are used to compute attenuation relative to free space. Just beyond LOS, diffraction
is the dominant mechanism. At great distances, well beyond the radio horizon, the
dominant propagation mechanism is usually forward scatter.[R.ef 8] Ihe detailed de-
scription of these propagation mechanisms is beyond the scope of this thesis. Here, the
more practical concern is for short range (LOS transmission) and long range (beyond
radio horizon) transmission.
When the radio LOS does not exist, path loss is more severe than described
above. Soil composition, horizontal distance, location and height of obstacles, antenna
heights relative to curvature of the earth and atmospheric conditions tend to alter the
attenuation drastically. In this case, the following equation for path loss, which takes
(a) Full first Fresnel zone clearance
(b) Incomplete first Fresnel zone clearance














Figure 2. Loss due to lack of first Fresnel zone clearance
into account the lack of first Fresnel zone clearance, terrain loss and space loss,
applies. [Ref. 9]
Lp,p{dD) = 108 + 20 \02^flMlIz) + 40 log d{km) - 20 log h,{m)h,{m) + 12
where
h,{fn) = Transmitter antenna height in meters
h,{in) = Receiver antenna height in meters
JlMIlz) = Center frequency of the signal in megahertz
ci{km) = Distance in kilometers
Directivity and gain arc measures of how well energy is concentrated in a given
direction. Directivity, or power gain, is the ratio of power density in that direction to
the power density that would be produced if the power were radiated isotropically. Ihis
ratio is equal to that of the effective area of the antenna to the effective area of an
isotropic antenna. The characteristics of antenna parameters arc shown in lable 2.
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Isotropic 1 r-jAn = O.079();^ 360'
Short Dipole 1.5 h 3;.V87r = 0.1 194/2 90°
;./2 Dipole 1.6409 AIn 30;.2/;r/?,-0.13O6;.2 78.078°
A 14 Monopole 3. 2818 Ain 30;.V:t/^, = 0.261 2;.^ 78.078°
Small Loop 1.5 nXkD'nJA 3;.V87r = 0.1 194/2 90°
Parabolic Reflec-
tor
0.54(;r/;/;.)^ D 0.545 6i;.//)°
Horn 0.81(7rZ)/;.)^ D 0.8 IS 5o;.//)°
where
h = Antenna height (length) in meters
}. = Wavelength of the signal in meters
D = Aperture diameter in meters




S = Aperture area
Here, for the purpose of" the study, it is assumed that the transmitter uses a
onuiidirectional isotropic antenna and the receiver uses a parabolic reflector. The ap-





Multipath eflect should not be negligible. This efTect is very important to the
accuracy of the probability of detection calculation since it varies according to the
combination of the distance between two antennas and the center freciucncy of the sig-
nal. When there is one reflected ray combining with the direct ray at the receiving point
as shown in Tig. 3. the resulting field strength is related to the iiee space intensity, irre-






d = Distance between antennas
h = Emitter antenna height above ground
hj. = Receiving antenna height above ground
Figure 3. Interference bet>\een direct and reflected rays
E,= 2E, sin In
2/
wiiere
£, = Resulting field strength
/Trf = Direct ray field strength
= Geometrical length diflerencc between direct and rcfiactive paths
where /;, and h, arc the heights of the antennas in meters above the reflecting plane tan-
gent to the enecti\e earth. 'I he ratio of the reflecti\e and the direct rav field strength
can be written as a multipath factor, g, which the range is ^ ^ < 2. So the multipath





2. System Noise Factor - Noise Figure
In the absence of noise, tliere would be no degradation of signal quality and one
would need only gain to overcome propagation losses. Noise can mask weak signals and
create uncertainty in others. Random noise arises from several sources, including ex-
ternal radiation, noise generated internally called Johnson or thermal noise, shot noise
from vacumm devices, transistor noise and equivalent noise sources such as lossy ele-
ments that contribute effective noise power. This random noise is characterized as the
wideband with a uniform spectral density and the Gaussian amplitude probability
distribution.
Among various types of noises, the noise generated by the receiver is very sig-
nificant at a very high frequency. For this reason, it is important to review the source
of noise in a typical superheterodyne receiver and the methods commonly used to de-
scribe this noise.
Generally speaking, a receiving system consists of the antenna, mixer, amplifier
and detector, where mixer, local oscillator, amplifier and detector comprise the receiver.
The antenna is considered as a device which refiects its radiation resistance at the input
of the receiver from a thermal reservoir contained in that portion of space observed by
the antenna. If one considers the, observed medium to be a composite black body at
temperature T {°fC), the radiation resistance of the antenna will come into equilibrium
with the temperature of this reservoir. The power input to the receiver is then Johnson
noise power.
When calculating receiver signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), it is common for engi-
neers to use an approximate equation for noise power at the receiver input. The avail-




i\] = noise power in Watts
k = Boltzmann's constant (= 1.38 x 10-"7/°/0.
7o = standard temperature {290° K),
B, = the equivalent rectangular bandwidth of the receiver in hertz
Expressed in decibels, the following relationship results:
NiiciBm) = -1 14 + 10 log B,{MHz)
where N,{dBm) is noise power represented in decibels below one watt and B^MIi^) is
receiver effective bandwidth in megahertz.
The noise power of a practical receiver is always higher than the thermal noise
of an ideal receiver because noise is introduced by every component in the receiver. The






F„ = Noise figure
(SNR), = SNR at the input of the receiver
{SNR)„ = SNR at the output of the receiver
r„{(iB) = Noise figure in decibels
Since the input SNR is always greater than the output SNR, the noise figure is always
greater than unity.
3. Scanning Factor - Superherodyne Receiver
A superheterodyne receiver is the most commonly used receiver in communi-
cations because of its high scnsiti\ ity and selectivity. Almost all commercial radios and
radar receivers are of this type. In liW applications, superheterodyne receivers are used
to isolate an input signal and measure from its fine-grain information. A
superheterodyne receiver uses filtering, a mixer, and a local oscillator to translate the
received signal to a lower iiitcnncdiatc frequency (IF), riltcring and amplification that
14
would not be possible at the signal frequency, are possible at this lower IF. Because of
this, a superheterodyne receiver possesses greater frequency selectivity compared to
other types of receivers.
A basic superheterodyne receiver is shown in Fig. 4. This receiver is composed
of a mixer, a local oscillator (LO), an intermediate-frequency (IF) filter, an IF amplifier
and a video detector. The LO generates a continuous-wave (CW) signal of frequency
fiQ. If the input signal frequency is/^f, the mixer will shift /^^ to/;;-, which is the difference
frequency of/^o and/;,f. This procedure is called down-conversion. The IF filter following
the mixer is a bandpass filter that is used to pass the desired IF signal and to stop all
other frequencies generated in the mixer.
The IF filter is also part of the frequency measurement circuit, because /^^^ and
fjjr are known, /^p can be measured. The IF amplifier following the IF filter will provide
most of the gain of the receiver. This gain will increase the sensitivity of the receiver.
Following the IF amplifier is a crystal video detector. The detector is an envelope de-
tector that converts microwave energy to a video signal. 1 he elTect of the video band-
width should be considered. A video amplifier, following the detector, is often used to
amplify the video signals for further processing. In an ESM receiver, a comparator or
threshold detector is often used after the video amplifier to detect the existence of the
input signals. When the input signal is near but below the threshold, the noise riding on
the signal may still trigger the comparator.
Because of its narrow input bandwidth, a superheterodyne receiver has the
highest sensitivity and dynamic range of all EW receivers. However, the narrow band-
width will critically limit the FOl. To cover a wider input bandwidth, the receiver can
be made to scan a given bandwidth at a fast rate, repeatedly. This type of receiver is
often referred to as a scanning superheterodyne receiver.
A typical scanning superheterodyne receiver is the narrowband ^'IG-tuned type.
With this receiver, each frequency resolution cell of interest is examined sequentially by
tuning the ^'IG local oscillator. When an activity is detected in any frequency resolution
cell, the sweep stops to allow the processor to analyze the detected signals. The RF
bandwidth of the narrowband ^'l(;-tuncd superheterodyne receiver is limited by the
bandwidth of the MG-tuncd preselection filter, typically ranging from 20 to 60 MHz,
depending on the number of stages within the filter structure.[Ref 1('|
In scanning the local o^^cillator. to attempt loo^o POl with high sensitivity, if














Figure 4. Diagram of a basic superheterodyne receiver
case, if signal is not in 'F bandpass long enough to rise to full amplitude, there is a sig-
nificant loss in sensitivity of the receiver such as:[Rer. 11]





L,{dB} = Scanning loss over fixed signal in decibels
D, = Total scan width in liertz
1 ] = Superhet Scan Time in seconds
B, = Receiver Acceptance Bandwidtli in hertz
I herefore the dwell time, at a given frequency, should be longer than the recip-
rocal of the II-" bandwidth. It is desired to dwell on a given frequency for a stiflicicnt
length of time to improve the probability of intercept and to allow time domain
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parameters to be measured by the ESM receiver. Another consideration for the sweep
rate is due to the efTect of the sweep rate on the amplitude of the envelope at the output
of the IF amplifier. If the sweep rate is too fast, the IF output becomes essentially the
impulse response, and the amplitude of output is decreased. In order to avoid the at-
tenuation in amplitude, the dwell time should be longer than the signal build-up time.
Suppose that the dwell time of the receiver equals to ,.'
,
where dfldi is time on fre-
dJIdt










This gives the fastest scan rate as follows:
^ J max
That is, we can minimize the scanning loss L, by B,> ^JDJT, , but should realize that
increasing IF bandwidth gives poorer resolution in frequency and thus poorer signal
information.
A primary" component of a typical communication intercept system is the double
or triple-conversion superheterodyne receiver, which is normally designed for operation
over the entire HF band, and part of the VIIF/UHF bands. A high performance HF
receiver uses a I Hz step synthesizer which has the memor\" capability to hold the 100
most significant threat channels. Frequency stability is ± I ppm over the temperature
range and the single sideband sensitivity is 1 ^Ffor 10 dB output SNR. Dynamic range
is 80 to 100 dB for signals spaced at least 20 kHz apart. Single-sideband (SSB), AM,F.M,
and CW can be individually identified and frequency shift keying (FSK) can be decoded
with an individual modem. [Rcf 2]
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4. Signal to Noise Ratio
Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is the predominant factor in determining probability
of detection in the presence of the noise. 1 he SNR is a function of various transmitter
and the receiver parameters. The output SNR of the receiver can be expressed as follows.
SNR{dB} = S-idBm) - iY,{dBni) - L,{dB) - F^dB)
where
SNR{dB) = Receiver output SNR in decibels
S{dBni) = Received signal power at the input of the receiver
in decibels below one milliwatt
i\',{dBin) = Receiving system noise power in decibels below one milliwatt
L,{dB) = Receiver scanning loss in decibels
F^{dB) = Noise figure in decibels
Let us combine all the parameters in one equation. Then the output SNR is:
SNR{dB) = P,{dBm) + G,{dB) -{- G,(dB) - 10 log B,




Since we consider two types of path loss, which are the free space path loss within LOS,
and the spread path loss well beyond the radio horizon; the equation becomes:
SXRj;{dB) = P,(dB>n) + G,{dB) + G,{dB) +114





Si\R,^(dB) = P,{dBni) + G,{dB) + G,{dB) +114





The probability of intercept is a function of the sensitivity of the receiver, and the re-
ceiver sensitivity is strongly related with this SNR.
5. Geometric Consideration - Radio Horizon
Under normal propagation conditions, the refractive index of the atmosphere
decreases with height so that radio rays travel more slowly near the ground than higher
altitudes. This variation in velocity with height results in bending of the radio rays.
Uniform bending may be represented by straight line propagation, but with the
radius of the earth modified so that relative curvature between the beam path and the
earth remains unchanged. The new radius of the earth is known as the effective earth
radius, and the ratio of the effective earth radius to true earth radius is usually denoted
by K. The average value of A' in temperate climates is about 1.33; however, values from
about 0.6 to 5,0 are to be expected.
Under certain atmospheric conditions, the refractive index may increase with
height, causing the radio ways to bend upward. Such inverse bending results in a increase
in path clearance on LOS paths, but a decrease in reception.
The distance to the radio horizon over smooth earth, when the hcigiu, /?, is very




d = the smootii earth horizon distance in kilometers
K = ratio of the effective to the true radius of the earth
R = the true earth's radius in kilometers
h = the effective antenna height in meters




1 he radar horizon between the transmitter antenna and the receiver antenna in kilome-
ters is
The graphical description of this scenario is shown in Fig. 5.
This relation shows that once the altitudes are given, if the slant range between
the emitter and the intercept system exceeds R„2, then no signal from the transmitter
could be detected by the intercept system.
Ihe SNR is then modified to take into account the radio horizon as follows
SNR = <X>{Ri,z - Rjr) X SNRf, + (])(/? ^-^ - R„^) x SNR,^
or
where
Rji^ = Distance between the transmitter and the receiver in kilometers
R„2 ~ Radio horizon distance in kilometers
note that (I>(.v) is called Ileaviside step function, which returns when the argument is
less than 0. other\vise returns 1. 1 hat is, if the distance between the transmitter and the
intercept system is within the radio horizon, then SNR is equal to Si\R^„ otherwise
S.\R is equal to SNR,^.
6. Receiver Sensitivity - ESM Line
One basic requirement for interception of signal is that some portion of the
electromagnetic energy radiated Irom the emitter should be impinged on the ESM an-
tenna. In order to visualize the SNR for the case under consideration, we can make use
of nS.VI line as shown in I'igure 6. Ihis figure shows the relationship between the re-
ceiver acceptance bandwidtli and the maximum allowable range. The slope of the signal
power line is constant and equals 20 dlV'decadc, showing the reciprocal of /^^ dependence
of the signal power with range, as expressed earlier. The noise power line is horizontal,
showing the independence of the noise power with range.
1 he interception of this signal is determined by the relationship of the signal





Vx Effective earth surface ^ h r
/^d,
.
transmitter line-of-sight distance \/ dr = receiver line-of-sight distance \
ht = transmitter antenna height \
hr = receiver antenna height
Figure 5. Graphical description of the radio horizon
frequency and the range) and the noise power, wliich is a function of the receiver ac-
ceptance bandwidlli. The interception of the available SNR, expressed in decibels, is
given by the vertical distance between the signal line and the noise line as indicated in
Fig.5.
The minimum detectable signal, S^^^. or the receiver sensitivity, is delined as the
minimum SNR at the receiver input, multiplied by noise power of the receiver accept-
ance bandwidth. 1 his relationship can be expressed as follows.
where {Si\R)^,„ is the minimum SNR.
7. Probability of False Alarm
In COMINT receivers, the probability of false alarm is calculated assuming the
input to be noise only. Assuming the input noise to be Gaussian, one can show that the
probability of false alarm is given by Ref. 12.
/^/-a
















N(BWl)=Noise power of bandwidth 1
N(BW2)=Noise power of bandwidth 2
Rmax(BW!)=Maxinium range of bandwidth 1
Rmax(BW2)=Maximum range of bandwidth 2
SNRmin=Minimum signal to noise ratio
Figure 6. Graphical description of ESM line
where Kj- is the preestablished threshold voltage, and \j/„ is the variance, or mean square
p
value of the noise voltaee. The value of ^ , is analogous to the sicnal to noise voltage
2.A„
ratio, using the threshold voltage \'j, to represent signal voltage.
'] he signal detection process in most intercept recciveis is described in terms of
threshold detection. Almost all detection decisions arc based upon a comparison of the
output of a receiver with some tiircshold level. If the envelope of tiic receiver output
exceeds a preestablished threshold, a signal is said to be present. 1 he threshold detector
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allows a choice between one of two hypotheses. One hypothesis is that tlie receiver
output is due to the noise only; the other is that the output is due to signal-plus-noise.
7"wo types of error may be made in this decision process. One is to mistake noise
for a signal when only noise is present while the other is to erroneously consider signal
to be noise. The former is called a type I error while the latter is called a type II error.
This threshold detection is selected so as not to exceed a specified false alarm
probability, that is, the probability of detection is maximized for a fixed probability of
false alarm. 1 his is equivalent to fixing the probability of type I errors which occur when
noise exceeds the threshold creating a false alarm, and minimizing type II errors which
occur when noise reduces signal below threshold for a missed detection. So it is similar
to the Neyman-pearson test used in statistics for determining the validity of a specified
statistical hypothesis.[Ref 12 ] Therefore, this type of threshold detector is sometimes
called a Xeyman-Pearson detector.
Neyman-Pearson criterion provides the uniformly most powerful statistically
based test for obtaining an indication of the case when a signal exceeds the threshold.
Tests other than Neyman-Pearson lead to a higher probability of error for a given SNR
[Ref 12). 7"he Neyman-Pearson criterion is well suited to the intercept receiver work
since it directly leads into the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm
discussions.
1 he probability of false alarm is very important in radar nSM receivers since
every false alarm is displayed as an intercept. Excessive false alarms generate unneces-
sary input data, degrading the ESM processors ability to sort and identify signals of in-
terest. The effect of probability of false alarm on the overall performance of an ESM
system was analyzed in Nicholson[Ref 13] where he makes use of the Baycs theorem.
Nicholson shows that the threat warning systems require the probability of false alarm
much smaller than 1 x 10 '^ in order to avoid excessive signal classification error.
In COMINT operation, the significance of the probability of false alarm is less
than that in radar, since the communication intelligence data is not as time critical as
radar ESM data. But one has to consider the efiect of the probability of false alarm on
the probability of detection, since the probability of detection is explained as a function
of false alarm probability.
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III. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY CONCEPT
A. DEFINITION OF PROBLEM
Intercept of a signal is one form of reconnaissance and possess many of the char-
acteristics of reconnaissance systems in general. Reconnaissance is a collection of in-
formation on the facilities, capabilities and intentions of potential or actual hostile
forces.[Ref 14] 1 he mission of reconnaissance is to measure the cirectiveness of these
facilities; to estimate their reliability; and to determine deployment and changes in the
enemy's strategy and tactics.
COMINI diHers significantly from ELIN'f. For one thing, the amount of infor-
mation required for a successful COM INT operation is much greater than that required
for a successful ELIN'f operation. Even though there is a significant dilTerence between
message reception in COMINT and ELINT, it is essential to the success of both oper-
ations to obtain knowledge of the possible disposition of a hostile presence as early as
possible. To do this, an intercept system with a high intercept probability is required.
The probability that a given signal is detected and processed, or POI. is a function
of both the signal and the receiving system. The ideal system should intercept any signal
emitted within the maximum range based on free space attenuation factors, system sen-
sitivity and terrain masking. We can imagine a system with high sensitivity, low prob-
ability of false alarm, wide RF bandwidth, 360 degree antenna coverage, large processing
capacity, being reliable, economical and having the POI of unity. Obviously any receiver
meeting all those requirements docs not exist. 1 he design of an intercept system has
trade-offs between these various factors.
To analyze an intercept system, considering POI, we should realize that POI is
largely a matter of definition based on particular purposes. I he definition of POI given
by Wiley[Ref 15] is that "the joint probability of three independent probabilities such
as; the probability that the receiver is tuned to the carrier frequency of the emitter, the
probability that tiie antenna is pointed toward the emitter, and the probability that the
emitter antenna is pointed toward the ESM station". I his in itself is not a comj-tlotely
satisfying definition when one wishes to use it to evaluate the dynamic situation of signal
environments and intercept systems competing against each other. Also, in a practical
communication situation, the antenna for both the emitter and the receiver usuallv uses
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an omni-directional antenna. In such a situation, the second and third cases would be
eliminated.
OrtizfRef. 16] derived a mathematical model for the scenario of airborne radars and
ESM receivers at a point in time and space, in this model, POI is deHncd as the product
of probabilities of three independent events, which arc; the probability of signal de-
tection from the noise, the probability of coincidence between the emitter and the re-
ceiver, and the probabihty of identification of the emitter by the receiver processor or the
operating system. This definition is quite reasonable and practical in the radar ESM.
In this thesis, we deal with COMINT, which concentrates on the reception of the
communication messages of hostile forces. Here, the POI is defmed as the product of
two independent probabilities which are; the probability of detection of signal from the
noise, and the probability of coincidence of various parameters between the emitter and
the receiver. The definition of detection probability is adopted from Ortiz (Rcf 16]. since
the behavior of a signal in the atmosphere is quite similar in both radar and communi-
cations. The probability of coincidence in this thesis is defined as the product of two
independent probabilities which are the probability of the transmitter-on and the prob-
ability of observation as a function of time, which is the probability that the intercept
receiver is tuned to that frequency during the same time and both antennas look at each
other at the same time. Therefore the definition of POI becomes:
where
P,{t) = probability of intercept at time /
I\ = probability of detection of signal from the noise
PciO ~ probability of coincidence of frequency at time t
B. SIGNAL DETECTION EROM THE NOISE
Probability of detection {I\) is a measure of the receiver's capability to detect a sig-
nal in the presence of noise. Signal detection in the presence of noise is equivalent to
deciding whether the receiver output is due to noise alone or to signal-plus-noise. \Mien
detection is performed by automatic electronic tuning, it cannot be left to chance, but
must be specified and built into the decision-making device by the system engineer. Here
the signal detection process is described in terms of threshold detection, or in other
words, Nevman-Pearson detection.
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If the fonn of a signal is known exactly, the probability of intercepting such a sinnnl
can be reduced to the probability of detecting it in the presence of noise. The probability
of detection, in a threshold detector, may be expressed as a function of the probability
of false alarm, which one is willing to tolerate, and the signal-to-noise ratio. If the de-
tection threshold level is raised to decrease the probability of false alarm, the probability
of detection will also decrease. The converse is also true. In other words, if we decrease
the detection threshold level to increase the probability of the signal levels crossing the
threshold, the probability of false alarm will also increase.
Skolnik[Ref 12] develops a simple formula for the probability of detection which is
a function of false alarm rate and the signal to noise ratio. This derivation is done by
assuming that the Gaussian noise is passing through the receiver's narrow band IF filter.


















This equation may be converted to power by replacing signal-to-rms-noise-voltage ratio
with tlie following:
/{ signal ampUiude Jl {nns signal voltage) I signal power \^j2 / 2.S \i/2
/,/, rnis noise voltage mis noise voltage
= 2
noise power i\
We shall also replace l\l2>l/„ by ln(l/P^J [from I-(iuation (2.1)]. Using the above re-
lationships, the probability of detection can be rewritten as follows: In order to express
this equation in the form of the signal-to-noise ratio and the false alarm probability, we





Tlie derivation of this equation is done by Ortiz [Rcf. 16] and we found his work rea-
sonable and accurate.
This is the final form of the equation for the probability of detection in forms of
signal-to-noise ratio and the probability of false alarm. In order to demonstrate that this
formula is valuable, we introduce Tsui's equation [Ref 10: pp. 24-42] for the probability
of detection, which deals with the effects of video bandwidth B^. Since most
superheterodyne receivers have approximately the same RF and video bandwidth, the
ratio of the video bandwidth to the RF bandwidtli
-j^ for superheterodyne receiver is
approximately unity. So the results of both equations should be reasonably close to each
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where >' = "^ anJ lierc is approximately unity. In equation (3.1), assuming i//,, = 1.0,
J\ can be determined from tlie given probability of false alarm, which is:
Two other statistical criteria, usually discussed when considering detection of targets
in noise, arc the likelihood ratio and the iincrse probabilit>'; but these types of rccei\crs
are seldom implemented in practice.[Rcf 12] In some cases, the receiver which computes
the likelihood ratio is equivalent to one ^^hich computes the cross-correlation function,
or one with a matched-liltcr ciiaractcristic. 1 he inverse probability receiver requires that
the probability of a target being present in a particular range cell must be known a
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priori. In practical situations, this is rarely possible. Thus, this type of receiver is difli-
cult to implement.
C. COINCIDENCE CONCEPT
The previous section introduced the concept of probability of signal detection when
greater degree of uncertainty of noise is involved. If the signal has sufficient strength to
cross the threshold and coincidence does not occur between the signal parameters and
the receiver parameters, the signal will not be intercepted.
1 he main point of concern here is determining the probability that an intercept
system is available, actively listening in the proper frequency band, in the right direction
and at the same time that the signal is received. Here it is assumed that there is adequate
signal energy available to the intercept receiver input such that the probability of de-
tection is nearly unity and the probability of false alarm is very small.
Considering the typical situation in which an emitter is radiating, a narrow band
superhet receiver is tuned to frequency across a band containing the signal of interest,
and a narrow beam parabolic antenna concurrently looks for the signal of interest, in
space.
We are concerned with the joint occurence or coincidence of those independent
events. Coincidence determines whether or not the signal will be intercepted. So the in-
tercept problem can be reduced to fmding the probability of coincidence of those events.
It is convenient to represent these events in frequency and angle as window
functions. Fig. 7 shows a time-frequency diagram for a receiver scanning the frequency
band from/„j„ to/„„ with a linear sawtooth sweep. This figure can be used to calculate
the probability of coincidence, in both time and frequency, between a periodic signal and
the tunable receiver's frequency acceptance band.
Coincidence calculations have been formed on the basis of the intercept probability
estimates done by Boyd [Ref 14], wiiey (Ref 15] and Schlesingcr (Rcf 17]. One of more
recent work in this area is by Wiley[Ref 15]. His work is based on the periodic nature
of pulse radar signal, rotating antenna and scanning receiver, which can be represented
as periodic window functions.
After necessary deleberation, we found that Wiley's equation for the probability of
coincidence is not applicable for the communication scenario, since most of the time, the
period of receiver scan and the antenna scan is much smaller than the signal duration.
In this thesis, after some modification of the equation for probability of interception
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de\ eloped by Sclilcsinger[Ref. 17], \\c choose to introduce a dilTcrent approach for tlie
coincidence problem.
Here, the consideration for probability of coincidence is the probability that the de-
sired emitter is operating during the period when observation is possible. So the proba-
bility of coincidence can be represented as the product of probability of the
transmitter-on and the probability of observation as a function of time. In order to ob-
serve the desired signal, two scanning characteristics should coincide each other. We can




/? = coincidence factor
A' = correction factor
r, = receiver dwell time in seconds
T„ = antenna illumination time in seconds
1] = receiver scan period in seconds
T, = antenna scan time in seconds
rJT^ = duty factor of the receiver (= DJD,)
xJT, = duty factor of the antenna (= 0/360°)
/?, = receiver acceptance bandwidth in hertz
D, = frequency coverage of interest in hertz
6 = receiver antenna beamwidth in degree
Since the emitter does not operate in the desired periodic manner, for simplicity, we
will assume that the mean signal duration is t„„ and the mean time between signals is
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Figure 7. Time-frequency diagram for scanning receiver
/\„ = probability of transiiiittcr-on
T,„ = mean signal duration in seconds
T„^ = mean time between signal exposure in seconds
Similarly, the probability of observing the signal by continously looking during the time
/ is a function of
(3.3)
where, /? is defined as the coincidence factor. Assuming /? is constant, liquation (4.3) is
explained as follows.
If there is no observation during the interval / + di, then observation must fail dur-
ing both of the intervals. / and di. Let the probability of not observing during i + di be
Ml -\- di); tlie probability of not observing during the period / is }.[iy. and for the period
<^/ is 1 — f]di. 'I'hcse relationships, assuming independence, can be expressed as
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;.{t + di) = Hi){i - Pdi)







In ;.(0 = - /?/
or
Therefore, the probability of observing the signal during the time period / can be written
as:
PM = 1 - e-^' (3.4)
Considering the results of Equations (3.2) and (3.4), the probability of coincidence dur-
ing the looking period time /, under this condition, is:
p,{t) = p,, X PM
or
P,{t) = P,,{\-e-P')
For / = 0, P^it) = 0, which indicates that if no time is spent looking, probability of coin-
cidence is zero. Also if the on-time of the transmitter, t^, equals to zero. /',(/) equals to
zero, which indicates that if the emitter is olF, it obviously cannot be coincided.
This gives the probability of coincidence of emitter and receiver, operating as difined
above, and assuming that the signal of interest has suOicicnt strength to cross the
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threshold. In communication scenario, if the sweep periods of both receiver and antenna
are fast enough than the signal duration, we may guarantee the 100 % signal inter-
ception which cross the threshold. That means, if we have fast scanning receiver and fast
rotating directional antenna or a very sensitive omni-directional antenna, the probability
of coincidence should be a certainty. Otherv^'ise, this equation derived here will give an
approximate answer which can evaluate the system performance from the parameters
of a given scenario.
D. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY FOR SINGLE INTERCEPT SYSTEM
Based on the results of various calculation for the probability of detection and the
probability of coincidence, we can obtain the final form of the probability of intercept
for a single intercept system. In practice, operation of single intercept system is not re-
alistic. Usually, there are two or more intercept system being operated. In order to un-




The probabihty of detection. P^, is evaluated based on the signal-to-noise ratio and
the probability of false alarm. The probability of coincidence, /*,(/), is a function of the
geometry of the intercept system and the hardware characteristics of the emitter and in-
tercept system.
A worksheet is developed in yXppendix D, to illustrate the evaluation of this
equation, and the analysis of the effects of various parameters is done in the next
chapter.
E. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY FOR MULTIPLE INTERCEPT SYSTEMS
We assume that the signal intercept system behaves probabilistically in the sense
that, when a signal of interest appears in the environment for some period of time the
probability that it will be intercepted is not one. There is no absolute guarantee that it
will be intercepted, therefore the system will not necessarily respond in a completely
deterministic way.
The assumptions for tlie discussion of the problem are as follows:
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1. There are two or more intercept systems excited by a common emitter source.
2. The receiving systems are colocatcd and tied to a common antenna, in which case
they share a comjnon channel.
3. The intercept probabilities of the intercept systems are dillcrent and the systems
behave independently in a statistical manner.
Based on these assumptions, tiie visualization of the environment is shown in Fig. 8. The
following discussion is based on Ref. 18.
If a signal of interest is transmitted, it will be intercepted by the receiving systems
in some combination or not at all. We wish to determine the probability of a specified
number of simultaneous intercepts. Let us define P{i\) as the probability of A' simul-
taneous intercepts where A' e {0,1,2, ... , «} and where n is the total number of the inter-
cept systems. Also define P,^ as the intercept probability of thcjth intercept system. For
the moment let us assume that the Pjj are known; then the calculation of /'(A") is given
as follows:
1. Calculate x, = PJil - P,)
2. Expand fU-v — ;c,) to obtain the polynomial
l'I(.Y - Xj) = flo-Y" + «i.v"-' + OjX"-^ + + a„
3. Calculate /'(A') = 1 a^. | /fl rt, |
The derivation of this algorithm is given in the Appendix B.
The mean and variance of this probability law can be calculated very simply. Let
us define the random variables, }} = 1 , when the intercept system, J, inteccpts the signal,
otherwise }', =
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Figure 8. Graphical description of intercept systems for common antenna
Also the variance of this probability law is given by:
where A' = E^X}.
If we consider a special case, that all the intercept systems have same probability
ofintercept, P,, = Pj'ij, then this probability law reduces to the binomial case. [Ref. 18]
AA') = ( ,^.)/f(i-^'/r''
where A'e (0.1,2. ... ,n] which has mean E[^X} = nP, and variance \'ar[^n'\ = nP,{\ — P,).
Using this concept, we can calculate the probability that the signal of interest is not
intercepted and the probability that more than one intercept occurs among the number
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of intercept systems. Since we know the formula for PiiV), the probabiUty of not inter-
cepting the signal of interest, P{0), is:
ft
/;=0
or, if the intercept systems have the same intercept probability, then
p{())={i-Pjr
Also, the probability that intercept occurs in any one of the systems is
P,{n) = P{i\> ])- 1 - P{0)
= i-{i-P,T
1 his result will be demonstrated graphically in the next chapter using MATIICAD.
F. TIME DEPENDENT PROBABILITIES
When one attempts to calculate the probability of intercept as a function of the
duration of the searching time, one encounters various problems related to the periodic
nature of the events under consideration.
Since the definition of probability of intercept is
P,{i) = P,xP,„xPM




where ft is K '
°
. Solving this equation for the time
Since the duty factors of the transmitter, the scanning superheterodyne receiver and
the rotating antenna arc fixed, we can reduce the time required to a certain intercept
probability by increasing the probability of detection, which is a function of signal-to-
noisc ratio. That means, the key factor to increase tlic probability of intercept in the




The analysis of the equations developed in this tliesis is accomplished using
MATIICAD2.0, which is a high-level prograniniing language equation solving software
package. We find that this software is very convenient to use in solving the complex
equations generated by this thesis without excessive programming effort.
One of the big advantages of MATHCAD is in its ability to solve and display
complex equations and to write text and to make on-screen plots quickly and easily.
Also this software supports more than 70 built-in functions, including various math-
ematical and statistical functions. Particularly useful to the analysis done in this thesis
is the capability to evaluate the error function, erj{.x), which is used extensively in cal-
culating the probability of detection. Another strength is the iteration capability. 1 his
capability made it possible to compare the various parameters in POI(t), by stepping
through the parameter variations.
1 he structure of the analysis is as follows. All initial parameter settings are given in
the SCI UP file. I he appication files do the following steps.
1. call SETUP file
2. assign parameter variables
3. calculate the POI as a function of the given parameters
4. plot the POI versus the given parameters
The detailed description of this flow diagram is shown in figure 9.
There are following files in Appedices C through G.
• Appendix C - SUTUP
1 he user inputs all emitter and interceptor parameters in this file.
• Appendix D - POIT
fhis file calculates the POI as a function of time under given setup condition.
• Appendix E(l) - POID
This file calculates the POI to determine the multipath effect as a function of
the distance between the emitter and the interceptor.
• Appendix 1^(2) - POI
F
'fhis file calculates the POI to determine the multipath effect as a function of
the frequencies of the signal.
• Appendix U(3) - POIA
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(calculate SNR for free space propagation)
I
(calculate SNR for beyond horizon propagation)
(calculate Radio Horizon)
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(calculate Probability of Detection)^
(calculate Probability of Coincidence)T
(calculate Probability of Intercept )
("Plot POI(variable) )
figure 9. Flon diagram of the analysis file
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This file calculates the POI to determine the multipath effect as a function of
the receiving antenna height of the interceptor.
• Appendix I-(l) - POIB
1 his file calculates the POI to dctennine the receiver acceptance bandwidth
effect as a function of the bandwidth of the interceptor.
• Appendix r(2) - POIV
This file calculates the POI for a superhet receiver and a general type receiver
to determine the video bandwidth effect.
• Appendix G - POIM
'Ihis file calculates the POI for multiple system operation as a function of the
number of interceptors.
B. PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
POIT can be easily used to predict the effects of varying Hmitter/Interceptor pa-
rameters. Fig. 10 shows the plot of POI(t) for a wide band, sweeping superheterodyne
receiver versus the tactical communication emitters. The numerical values of the pa-
rameter settings are as follows:
Radiated power from the emitter = 1 Watt
Power gain of the emitter isotropic antenna = 1 (no unit)
Center frequency of the signal = 50 MHz
Distance between the emitter and the interceptor = 20 km
Emitter antenna elevation above ground = 150 tn
Interceptor antenna elevation above ground = 150 m
Receiver acceptance bandwidth = 10 MHz
• Receiver noise figure = 10 dB
• Total frequency coverage = to 500 \niz
• Probability of false alarm = 10"
• Average operation time of the emitter = 5 seconds
• Average off-time of the emitter = 100 seconds
• Receiver dwell time = .02 seconds
• Receiver scan time = 1 second
• Antenna illumination time = .1 seconds
• Antenna scan time = 1 second
Some of these parameters affect the SNR only, and others affect the SNR and the
probability of coincidence. I here arc many combinations of the parameter values. 'Ihis
section analyzes the POI versus several parameter values as a function of time.
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l.'nder the condition that the coincidence factor is fixed and the transmitted power
increases from 10 niiHwatts to 1000 niilliwatts, we generate the POI plot as a function
of time as sliown in Fig. 10. In this figure, wc observe that the POI increases more
quickly over time as the transmitter power increases. Fig. 11 continues the conditions
of Fig. 10 with the coincidence being varied instead of the transmitted power which is
now fixed at 1000 milhwatts. VVe observe that by increasing the coincidence factor, we
can reduce the time required to obtain a certain POI and each curve converges to the
same value given sufficient time. In this intercept time model, the key factor to improve
the time basis POI is tlie coincidence factor.
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Figure 10. POIT plotd): Intercept time with signal power variation: /? = (».(>1
P= 10, 50, 100. 500, lOOO milliwatts
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Figure 11. POM p]ot<2): Intercept time nitli coinciclence factor variation: P, = 1
watt. /? = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1. 0.5, 1
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C. MULTIPATH EFFECT
The general features of the iiUerference phenomena associated with antennas, sepa-
ration distance and the frequency can be determined by studying the efTects associated
with these parameters. As shown in Fig. 3. the direct ray and indirect ray reach the re-
ceiving antenna. When the two path lengths differ by an appropriate amount, there will
be either constructive or destructive interference at the receiving antenna.
1. Probability of intercept as a function of the separation distance
POID can be used to measure the eflect of the multipath phenomena, associated
with the separation distance, in order to optimize the POI. By varying the separation
distance between the emitter and the interceptor, we can fmd the locations conducive to
constructive interference. Also, since the separation distance is one of the factors af-
fecting path loss, we observe, as expected, that the POI degrades as the distance in-
creases. The POID plot (POI as a function of the separation distance) is shown in
Fig. 12.
Figure 12. The POID plot: The effect on multipath of varying the distance
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2. Probability of intercept as a function of the antenna elevation
POIA can be used to measure the eflcct of the multipath phenomena associated
with the receiving antenna elevation. Under the conditions of fixed separation distance
and frequency, a computer run was made to observe tiie variation of the POl as a
function of antenna elevation variation. Once the identification of frequency and emitter
location is determined, then one can optimize the POI by choosing the appropriate an-
tenna elevation. The plot of POIA (POI as a function of an antenna elevation) is shown
in Fig. 13.
Figure 13. The POIA plot: The effect of the multipath by varying the antenna ele-
vation.
3. Probability of intercept as a function of frequency
The file POIF can be used to predict the cll'cct of the multipath phenomena
associated with the frequency of the signal. 1 he frequency transmitted by the hostile
emitter is not controllable by the intercept site. However, we can optimize tiie POI by
clioosing the appropriate antenna elevation and the interceptor location according to tiie
frcquenc}. 'I he frequency is also a factor in the path loss, since the patli loss is
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proportional to the square of the frequency, i.e., the higher the frequency tlie higher the
path loss. However, the frequency also alfects parabolic antenna gain factor. It is
desirable to make tradeoffs between the gain and the loss at given antenna elevation.
Fig. 14 shows the I'OIF plot associated with the frequency variation. Under the condi-
tions of given initial parameters, 50 MHz of the transmitted frequency provides less than
the maximum value of the I'OI. Ihen we need to reset the elevation of the interceptor





Figure 14. The POIF plot: The probabilily of intercept as a function of the fre-
quency
D. BANDWIDTH EFFECTS
1 he study of the intercept receiver chaiacteristics reveals performance dillbrcnccs
related to bandwidth, as dcHncd earlier. 1 he total frequency coverage, called /),. de-
scribes the breadth of the total lU' range over which the receiver can be operated. It
defines the maximum bandwidth that can be assigned to a monitoring receiver.
1 he next consideration is the receiver acceptance bandwidth which niay or may not
coincide in nunierical value with the total IVcqucncy coverage. It is the bandwidth over
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which tlie receiver is instantaneously sensitive. In a wide open receiver, the receiver ac-
ceptance bandwidth corresponds to the total frequency coverage, since at any instant the
receiver is equally responsive to signals anywhere in the total frequency range. In other
receivers, the receiver acceptance bandwidth is less than the total frequency bandwidth.
In a superheterod}ne receiver, for example, the receiver acceptance bandwidth equals the
IF bandwidth. It is also called the predetection bandwidth and is of prime importance
in controlling the intercept probability of the receiver. The predetection bandwidtii bears
a direct relationship to the common receiver characteristics of selectivity and resolution.
The ability to select one signal from a group of signals on a frequency dilference basis,
or to resolve two signals adjacent in frequency, is set in an intercept receiver by the value
of the receiver acceptance bandwidth.
1 he video or postdetection bandwidth usually represents a design compromise in-
fluenced by requirements peculiar to intercept receivers. The selection must be consistent
with the most severe requirement imposed by the need to reproduce to some degree the
modulation waveshape of any baseband signals or class of signals anticipated for recep-
tion. If, for example, the video bandwidth is two small, a narrow pulse will not reach full
amplitude. However, if the principal objective is only signal detection, a considerable
reduction in video bandwidth is allowable for only a small loss in weak signal
dctcctability, since there is a concomittant reduction of noise power bandwidth.
1. Probability of Intercept as a function of a receiver acceptance bandnidlii
The total frequency coverage bandwidth we considered is 500 MHz . If we vary
the receiver acceptance bandwidth, the noise power, receiver sweeping loss and the duty
factor of the receiver vary. Tig. 15, the POIB plot, shows the POI as a function of the
receiver acceptance bandwidth.
Once the receiver acceptance bandwidth increases above 1 MHz, the probability
of detection decreases
,
since the probability of detection is a function of the SNR. and
the recei\er noise bandwidth is directly related to the acceptance bandwidth. However,
the probability of coincidence increases with bandwidth, since the probability of coinci-
dence is an inverse function of the scanning factor, and the scanning factor deceases
when the receiver acceptance bandwidth increases. In this model, we can optimize the






Figure 15. The POIB plot: The prohahihty of intercept as a function of the receiver
acceptance bandnidth
2. \'ideo bandnidth effects
'I he file rOIG can be used to predict the video bandwidth eflcct associated with
the POI. Most superheterodyne receivers have approximately the same recei\er accept-
ance bandwidth and video (baseband) bandwidth. Actually, for the study of the
superheterodyne receiver, we could ignore the video bandwidth eObct with negligible
loss in accuracy.
For other recei\crs, a plot of POIG shows that the eflect of the video bandwidth
(varying the ratio of the receiver acceptance bandwidth to the video bandwidth, y).
Fig. 16 shows the I'OI as a function of the Nideo bandwidth using ecjuation 4.2.
in Fig. 16 and 17, POKj actually decreases as y increases bccau<;c with S\R less
than 3 dB. the noise actually grows faster than the signal with increasing y .
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Figure 16. The POIG plot(l) - The probahiUty of intercept as a function of tlie video
band\>idth: /', = 10 milliwatts. {SA7^^2^/?)
Figure 17. Ihe POIG pIot(2) - The probabihty of intercept as a function of the video
bandnidlh: P, = \5 n\\\\\\\i\n^ {S^^R^}dB)
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Figure 18. The POIG pl()t(3) - The prohahihty of intercept as a function of the video
bandwidth: /', = 20 milliwatts (SA/^:^.^/?)
In Fig. 18, POIG increases as y increases, as we expected, because with larger P„ SNR
is greater than 3 dB and the signal increases faster than the noise with increasing y.
In this model, we observe that if the SNR is less than 3 dB, when y increases,
the POI decreases. When SNR is greater than 3 dB, POI increases, as the value of y
increases.
E. PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
In the previous chapter, the theory of the POI for the multiple systems was de\el-
oped in terms of binomial characteristics when each interceptor has the same POI. In
order to intercept a signal with the intercept system working in a dense, dynamic envi-
ronment, multiple interceptors are necessary for a POI of unity. Certain assumptions
are made prior to demonstrating this:
• Individual intercept system function independently
• Individual intercept system has the same POI
Consequently, the POI for A' systems should have binomial characteristics. Fig. 19 shows
the results of the analvsis.
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Figure 19. The POIM plot: The prohability of intercept for multiple systems
In this model, we observe that we need at least six intercept systems in order to
achieve almost 100 % interception of the signal of interest.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we introduced the concepts and difficulties involved in calculation of
the POI for the ground-based communication intercept systems. The POI can be esti-
mated from the probability of detection and the probability of coincidence.
Probability of detection provides a measure of the receiver's capability to detect a
signal in the presence of noise. Because of the complexities of the signal environment
and the intercept receiver, the signal detection can not be determined in a deterministic
way. However, the signal detection can be expressed probabilistically as a function of the
SXR and the probability of false alarm. The SNR is a function of the various factors,
which are the transmitted power, the antenna gain, the path loss, the receiver noise fig-
ure and the receiver sweeping loss. We reviewed these factors in Chapter Two. 1 he
probability of detection was derived from the equation developed by Skolnik.[Ref 12J
If we have the very sensitive wideband receiver and the 360° coverage antenna, we
may intercept the signal which cross the detection threshold. However, because of the
cost and the high sensitivity of the receiver, we generally use the scanning
superheterodyne receiver and the scanning antenna. In this case, even though the signal
has sufficient strength to cross the detection threshold, it is not intercepted unless this
scanning factor coincide each other. This is very likely to be the situation in COMlN'f
operation.
The coincidence concept is introduced to model the main cause of the problem.
Since the operating time of the emitter, and the scanning factors of the receiver and the
antenna, behave stochastically and independently, we represent the probability of coin-
cidence as a product of the probability of transmitter-on and the probability of obser-
vation. The probability of observation is mainly a function of the coincidence factor of
the scanning parameters.
There are many previous works on the POI for radar ESM but not for COM INT.
Since many of the basic concepts of radar fSM and CO.MINf are the same, we built a
POI calculation model for COM IN f by appling radar CSM concepts.
Since the electromagnetic activities in the atmosphere for the COM INT operation
are somewhat similar to the radar ESM environment, the definition ol' the probability
of detection can be applicable to COMlN'f analysis. Communication activities gci^r-
ally occur at IIP and Vllf range. Since this range is generally lower than the radar
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frequency range, the propagation attenuation factor relating to the radio horizon was
disscussed and analyzed. There are various parameters affecting the propagation factor.
In this thesis, two types of the propagation were discussed; one is the free-space
propagation within LOS, the other is the spread propagation beyond the radio horizon.
Since we use a scanning superheterodyne type receiver, we discussed the sweeping loss
Ihe sweeping loss is a factor in reducing the SNR of the receiver output.
To apply the coincidence concept to the COMINT scenario, wc addressed the
problem where the signal duration is usually long enough to be intercepted by the
scanning receiver. The signal does not have the periodic nature of radar. It makes sense
that if scanning time is less than the signal duration, the signal should be intercepted.
This is, however, not practical for a typical COMINT receiver. Therefore we tried an
approach more suitable for available equipment performance specifications. We elimi-
nated the signal window function from the coincidence calculation and introduced the
concept of a joint occurence between two independent events which are; the event of
transmitter-on and the event of observation.
The definition of POI was presented as the product of two independent probabilities,
which are the probability of detection, the probability of coincidence. The probability
of coincidence is defined as the product of the probability of transmitter-on and the
probability of observation.
Since the probability of observation is a function of time, so is the POI In this dis-
cussion, the most consequential factor is the coincidence factor of the scanning param-
eters. If one has a unity coincidence factor, a wide bandwidth coverage receiver, and the
transmitter operating all the time, wc have unity POI. Otherwise, the interception of the
signal is not guaranteed and time is required to obtain a given POI.
We discussed and analyzed multipath effects. The multipath factor is mainly a
function of the separation distance, antenna heights and the frequency of the signal. As
one increases the separation distance, one observes that the interference phenomena
(either constructive or destructive) occur and the POI downgrades while it Ouctuates.
The POI behaves in the same pattern for the antenna elevations and the frequenc}'. Also
since the antenna height affects the radio horizon, above that distance, the POI is se-
verely reduced.
We also discussed and analyzed bandwidth effects. We demonstrated that the re-
ceiver acceptance bandwidth can be optimized, since the probabiHty of detection may
actually decrease when the receiver acceptance bandwidth increases, while the probabil-
itv of coincidence alwavs increases. The \ideo bandwidth was also discussed and
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analyzed. It was found that above llie 3 dD SNR point that the POI increases when the
ratio of the RF bandwidth to the video bandwidth, y, increases. However, when the SNR
is less than 3 ciB, the POI decreases as y increases.
We then discussed the POI for multiple systems. Under a given probability of de-
tection and the probability of coincidence, we demonstrated that the POI can reach near
unity when we use the optimal number of intercept systems.
Since the coincidence concept is the most dilTicult to analyze mathematically, and
represents the weakest part of the model developed in this thesis, it is recommended that
further study on this concept be carried out. Because of the stochastic nature of the
signal and the complexity of the analysis, it is reasonable to develop a Monte Carlo
simulation program. The POI of CO.MINT systems is a function of the various pa-
rameters of the emitter and the receiver. Thus, POI can be described in terms of dynamic
engagements of emitter/receiver parameters. 1 his thesis is one approach to evaluate the
capability of COMINT systems in a dynamic electronic warfare environment.
'^\
APPENDIX A. CHARACTERISTICS OF GROUND BASED
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
Following information is based on Jane's Defense Data (Ref 19]










R-102M IIF 900 N A N A vcliicular
R-103M I IF 50 N,.'A N/A vehicular
R-104J04M IIF 1,10 1.5-4.25 20-50 manpack
or \ehicu-
lar
R-105 IIF 1 36.0-46.1 N;A vehicular
or
manpack
R-108 IIF 1 28.0-36.5 N/A vehicular
or
manpack
R-1U9 IIF 1 21.5-28.5 N A vehicular
or
manpack





0.5 48.65-51.35 2-3 manpack
R-107,K)7T HF/VIIF-FM 1 20-52 6-25 manpack
R-llI I IF' VI IF 75 20-52 35 vehicular
R- 11 2 III-, AM 50-90 2.8-4.99 25-100 vehicular
R-113 IIF F.VI 16 20-22.375 20 vehicular
R-116 VI IF 0.1 48.65-51.35 1 manpack
R-11S.118B.\1 III 250 1.0-7.5 600 vehicular
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Table 4. GROUND BASED COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT FOR \\\
POTHETICAL HOSTILE FORCES(CONT.)
R-123.123M IIF/VIIF 20 20-51.5 20-50 \chicular
R-125 Iir/VIIF N,A N A N A vehicular
R-126 VIIF TM 0.5 48.5-51.0 1-2 nianpack
R-13() IIF 10-40 1.5-10.99 75,3.50 vehicular
R-14S VlIF 1.1-2.1 37.0-51.95 5 nianpack
R-154 IIF N/A 1.0-12.0 N,A X A
R-303 IIF 13-24 3.024-22.832 N„'A vehicular
R-392A VI IF 1 44.0-46.1 N/A nianpack
R-40 1,403 VIIF,'FM 2.5 60-70 40-50 vehicular
R-405 UIIF FM 2.5 320-420 40-50 \chicular
R-1125r IIF VlIF N A N,A N A vehicular
5P21B-1 VIIF 8-15 33-46 15-20 li.xcd
5P21C-3 VlIF 8-15 33-46 N A fixed
Angara IIF SSB 10 100 1.6-9 500 fixed
Mayak-S M,C 12 146-174 15-30 fixed
PKM-5.20 IIF ISB 5K;20K 3-30 N A fixed
Polyct-IA VIIF 5 100-149.975 N A fixed
Viola LIIF 8 148-173 N A fixed
YADRO-2 IIF 400 2-30 N A fixed
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APPENDIX B. ALGORITHM DERIVATION OF INTERCEPT
PROBABILITY^ FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
As disscussed in Chapter IV, we may calculate the probability of n simultaneous
intercept sustems if the intercept probabilities of the individual intercept system are
known. Following discussion is based on [Ref. 18]. Let
Then for A' = 2 it follows that
PiO) = PnP,2 {B.2a)
^{^) = iPnlPn+ Pi2!Pi2)P;\Pi2 (^-2/-^)
P{2)=PnPn (^-20
and similarly for A' = 3 we obtain
3
3
A2j = (j~nlPn + PnlPn + Pi3lPn)Ylrij (^-3^)
3
n3) = l|r/; {n.2d)
Now suppo.sc we know P{n} and wish to solve for pj^. Define
-rj-PijIPil in. A]
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By algebraic substition among (B.2) or (B.3), \vc find
/X0).r;-/Xl)A-.+ /X2) = (Z?.5)
for A' = 2 and
P{0)xj - P{ 1 )xj + I\2)xj - I\3) = (5.6)
for iV = 3. In general, for any N the result is
P{0)xf - P{l)xf-^ + P{2)xf-^ -••• + ( -l)V(A-) = {B.J}
Thus the Xj are the roots of the polynomial equation(B.7) and from these roots we may
calculate the p,^ using (B.l) through (B.4) as
r,j = xjl{\+xj) {B.S)
It is now clear if the p,j are known we may obtain a polynomial having the form
(B.7) as
]~](.v - .r^.) = flo.Y^' + «,.r'"*~' + a2X-^'~^ + - + a^ (119)




P{n) = \a„\lY^\a,\ (5.10)
/<:=0
This is the fmal form of the algorithm discussed in Chapter II I. K.
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APPENDIX C. SETUP FILE
SETUP FILE
**********
SETUP - This file initializes all emitter and interceptor system
parameters. Any change to these parameters will be read by
the probability files as they are excuted.
Therefore, after changing a parameter, ensure that any
files desired to change are loaded and excuted.




freq := 50- 10
dist := 20
ht : == 150
hr : == 150
6
Br : == 10 10
FndB := 10
6
Ds : == 500- 10
-4





t : = .02
s
T : = 1
s
t : = 0.1
a
T : = 1
a
K : = 5
Effective radiated power of emitter (Watts)
Aperture diameter of the antenna (meters)
Center frequency (hertz)
Distance between the emitter and the receiver
(kilometers)
Emitter antenna elevation above sea level
(meters)
Intercept antenna elevation above sea level
(meters)
Receiver acceptance bandwidth (hertz)
Noise figure (dB)
Total frequency coverage (hertz)
Probability of false alarm
Average operating time of emitter (sec)
Average off time of emitter (sec)
Dwell time of the receiver (sec)
Total scan time of the receiver (sec)
Look dwell time of the antenna (sec)
Total scan time of the antenna (sec)
Correction factor
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All parameters are written into the file called SETUP. PFiN and
will be called by the probability file when necessary

















WRITEPRN [setup ] setup
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APPENDIX D. MATHCAD WORKSHEET FOR INTERCEPT TIME
(POIT)
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
POIT - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a
function of time for a moving or fixed emitter as observed








































Received signal power calculation








GrdB := 10- log(Gr)
calculate the free space path loss
freq'




calculate the path loss for beyond horizon distance
freq'
Lp := 108 + 20- log
sp
10
+ 401og(dist) - 20- log(ht hr) + 12
calculate the multipath factor
'ht hr
g2 := 2 sm 2ir-
dist X
calculate the received signal power for the free space
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 101og(g2) - Lp
fs fs
calculate the received signal power for the distance beyond the horizon
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 101og(g2) - Lp
sp sp
Noise power calculation






LsdB := 1 4- 0.195-
Ds
Ts- Br
Signal to noise ratio calculation
signal to noise ratio for the free space







signal to noise ratio for the distance beyond the horizon







calculate the radio horizon distance
RHZ := 4.12 [Jht + Jhr
calculate the signal to noise ratio
SNR := $ (RHZ - dist) SNR + # (dist - RHZ) • SNR
fs sp
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PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION
A : = In
Pfa
:=iB := JSNR
Pd := - (1 - erf (A - B)
)
2
[-(A - B) Jexp[
f^AAir- B














Pob := 1 - expT-r- t 1
k L kJ
Pc := Pon- Pob
k k
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PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF TIME CALCULATION







APPENDIX E. MATHCAD WORKSHEET FOR MULTIPATH EFFECT
A. POID WORKSHEET
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCilON OF DISTANCE
POIR - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a
function of the separation distance between the emitter
and the intercept station as observed by a scanning
superhet receiver and a scaning antenna







i := 1 . .100



























Received signal power calculation







GrdB := 10- log(Gr)





















Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB - Lp
fs fs
i i















signal to noise ratio calculation



























RHZ := 4.12- [jht + vfhrj
SNR := $ TrHZ - dist 1 • SNR + f Tdist - RHZ] • SNR
i L ij fs L i J sp
i
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION





Pd . [X - erf ^A - B^]j
...
• >Jt4- Jt- B





Pd := Pd f fSNR - .00001• OOOOll
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t : == 500
Pob := 1 -- exp(-r- t)
Pc := Pon- Pob
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE CALCULATION








PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF FREQUENCY
POIF - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a
function of frequency for fixed or moving emitter as
observed by a stationary scanning superhet receiver and
a scaning antenna





i := 1 . .100
6































Received signal power calculation









GrdB := 10- logfGr


















+ 40 log(dist) - 20 log(hthr) + 12
Si := PtGtdBm -f- GrdB - Lp
fs i fs
i i
















































Radio hori zon calculation
RHZ := 4.12 [|ht + jhrj
SNR := $ (RHZ - dist) • SNR + $ (dist - RHZ) • SNR
i fs sp
i i
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION
A : = In
1
B : = SNR
Pfa 1 \ 1
Pd
^
== -. [1 - erf [. - BJ]
...





4>^T- B 16 B
Pd := Pd $ rSNR - .00001]
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Pob := 1 - exp(-r- t)
Pc := Pon Pob
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF FREQUENCY CALCULATION












PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF ANTENNA ELEVATION
POIA - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a
function of interceptor antenna height/elevation for a
moving or fixed emitter as observed by a stationary
scanning superhet receiver and a scaning antenna







i : = 1 ..150
dist := data
3
ht : == data
4
hr : = 150 + i
i




Ds : == data
8
Pfa : = data
9




ts : == data
12
Ts : == data
13
ta : == data
14
Ta : == data
15
K : = data
16
Interceptor antenna height/elevation
from 151 meters to 300 meters above
the sea level
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Received signal power calculation







GrdB := 10- log(Gr)
Lp := 32.45 + 20- log
fs
freq"











+ 40 log(dist) - 20- log
dist-
X
rht- hr 1 + 12
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB - Lp
fs fs















signal to noise ratio calculation





SNR := 10 92
fs i
i














i : = $ FrhZSNR $ fRH - dist] • SNR + $ fdist - RHZ 1 • SNR
fs i] sp
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION













Pd := Pd $ rSNR - .OOOOll
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Pob := 1 - exp(-r- t)
Pc := Pon- Pob
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT AS A FUNCTION OF ANTENNA ELEVATION
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APPENDIX F. MATHCAD WORKSHEET FOR BANDWIDTH EFFECT
A. rOlB WORKSHEET
POIR - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a function
of the receiver acceptance bandwidth for a moving or fixed emitter
as observed by a stationary scanning superhet receiver and a scaning
antenna








i : = 1 ..100
dist := data
3
ht : == data
4
hr : == data
5
6




Ds : == data
8
Pfa : = data
9








ts : = Ts
i Ds
ta : =-- data
14
Ta : == data
15
K : = data
16
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Received signal power calculation







GrdB := 10- log(Gr)
Lp := 32.45 + 20- log
fs
freq










+ 40log(dist) - 20- log(ht- hr) + 12
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB - Lp
fs fs
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB - Lp
sp sp
Noise power calculation















signal to noise ratio calculation
SNRdB := Si - NidBm - LsdB - FndB

























RHZ := 4.12 [jht + >fhrj
SNR := f (RHZ - dist) • SNR + $ (dist - RHZ) • SNR
fs sp
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION
A : = In B : = SNR
Pfa 1 \ 1
Pd





4- Jir- B 16 B
Pd := Pd -^rSNR - .OOOOll
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PROBABILITY OF COINCIDENCE CALCULATION
ta ts






Pob := 1 - expf-Ti1
Pc := Pon- Pob
i i
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT CALCULATION














PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT VERSUS VIDEO BANDWIDTH FILE
POIV - This file calculates the probability of intercept as a
function of the ratio of the RF bandwidth to the video
bandwidth for a moving or fixed emitter as observed by
a stationary scanning general type receiver and a scaning
antenna



































Received signal power calculation








GrdB := 10 log(Gr)
Lp := 32.45 + 20 log
fs
freq
Lp := 108 + 20- log
sp






+ 401og(dist) - 20- log(ht- hr) + 12
dist-
X
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 10- log(g2) - Lp
fs fs
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 10- log(g2) - Lp
sp sp
Noise power calculation











signal to noise ratio calculation








SNRdB := Si - NidBm
sp sp







RHZ := 4.12- [>|ht + >fhrj
SNR := $ (RHZ - dist) • SNR + $ (dist - RHZ) • SNR
fs sp
PROBABILITY OF DETECTION CALCULATION
i := 1 . .100
r := i
i
Kl := 1 + SNR
































rK4 - 1] exp

































>f2 IT 6 K2




1 1 1 1









Pd := Pdl -^r.S - Pdl 1 + Pd2 • $ rPd2 - .5]
Probability of coincidence calculation
ta- ts





t : = 500
Pob := 1 -- exp(-T- t)
Pc : = Pon Pob














APPENDIX G. MATHCAD WORKSHEET FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
(POIM)
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
POIM - This file calculates the probability of intercept for
multiple interceptors operations against a moving or
fixed emitter, using multiple stationary scanning superhet
receivers and a common scaning antenna




































Received signal power calculation








GrdB := 10- log(Gr)
Lp := 32.45 + 20- log
fs
freq









+ 40 log (dist) - 20- log(ht- hr) + 12
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 10 log(g2) - Lp
fs fs
Si := PtGtdBm + GrdB + 10 log(g2) - Lp
sp sp
Noise power calculation











signal to noise ratio calculation















RHZ := 4.12 [x[ht + jhrj
SNR := $ (RHZ - dist) • SNR + $ (dist - RHZ) • SNR
fs sp




Pd := -(1 - erf (A - B)
)
2
exp [-(A - B) J
+
r.^ B












k := 1 . .500
t := k
k
Pob := 1 - expf-r- t 1
k [ kj
Pc := Pon- Pob
k k
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT CALCULATION
POI := Pd Pc
k k
89
PROBABILITY OF INTERCEPT FOR MULTIPLE SYSTEMS
POI := POI Define initial POI as POI(t=500) for one system
500
i := 1 . .10
POI for 1 system
i
POI := 1 - II - POI
I
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matical analysis of pro-
bability of intercept
for ground-based communi-
cation intercept system.

